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INTRODUCTION
Johnnie Cochran, Robert Shapiro, and F. Lee Bailey all became famous
as criminal defense attorneys. Television dramas depicting the high-stakes
world of criminal trials, focusing on charismatic lawyers winning difficult
cases, continue to captivate audiences around the country.1 Outside of the
bright lights of Hollywood, however, the protagonists of these courtroom
dramas often play little role at trial. Instead, when faced with the complexities and uncertainty of criminal trials, an increasingly large number of
defendants choose to forgo the assistance of a lawyer.2 While defendants’
reasons for representing themselves are as varied as the charges levied
against them, doing so consistently creates headaches for all parties
involved.3 And where a pro se defendant’s behavior at trial raises questions
about his competence, these headaches can quickly become more serious.
This Comment examines the situation in which a pro se defendant’s behavior raises questions about his own competence during trial. Is this
defendant, otherwise proceeding pro se, required to have the assistance of
counsel at his own competency hearing? Every federal court of appeals to
consider this question has answered in the affirmative and has held that
failing to provide such assistance is constitutional error.4 However, the
courts of appeals are split in deciding the proper remedy for this error. This
Comment argues that by examining the different remedies courts have used
from contractual, practical, and behavioral perspectives, granting an automatic
reversal emerges as the best option available. When the lights go out and
† Senior Editor, University of Pennsylvania Law Review. J.D. Candidate, 2015, University of
Pennsylvania Law School; B.A., 2012, University of Pennsylvania. I am grateful to my family and
friends for their unwavering patience and support. All errors herein are my own.
1 See, e.g., Stephanie Francis Ward, The 25 Greatest Legal TV Shows, ABA J OURNAL (Aug. 1,
2009, 11:50 PM), http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/the_25_greatest_legal_tv_shows/,
archived at http://perma.cc/H63E-ZZW8 (“From Perry Mason to Leland McKenzie, Jack McCoy
to Patty Hewes, lawyers have been among the most durable and popular characters on the small
screen.”).
2 See Michael W. Loudenslager, Giving Up the Ghost: A Proposal for Dealing with Attorney
“Ghostwriting” of Pro Se Litigants’ Court Documents Through Explicit Rules Requiring Disclosure and
Allowing Limited Appearances for Such Attorneys, 92 MARQ. L. REV. 103, 107 (2008)
(“Courts . . . have experienced significant growth in the number of pro se litigants appearing
before them in recent years.”).
3 See Paula J. Frederick, Learning to Live with Pro Se Opponents, GPSOLO, Oct.–Nov. 2005, at
48, 50 (“Unfortunately, from a lawyer’s perspective, opposing a pro se litigant often means
additional headaches.”).
4 See infra Part II.
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the television cameras are gone, a bit of pro se paternalism may preserve the
liberty and save the lives of defendants facing trial on their own.
In Part I, this Comment explains the origin of the right to counsel under
the Sixth Amendment. After tracing the right’s history and rationale, the
concept of a “critical stage”—a stage of a criminal proceeding in which the
guarantees of the Sixth Amendment are implicated—is examined more
closely. In Part II, this Comment discusses whether a defendant’s competency hearing should be characterized as a “critical stage.” After explaining
that every court of appeals to consider the question has answered it in the
affirmative, the Comment turns to the issue of the appropriate remedy for
the deprivation of counsel at a competency hearing. Part III examines the
current circuit split over the proper remedy for a competency-stage deprivation and uses two courts of appeals cases to demonstrate the different
remedy decisions courts have made. Part IV provides affirmative justifications for choosing automatic reversal to remedy competency-stage deprivations. Finally, Part V acknowledges and responds to potential criticisms of
automatic reversals in the competency hearing context.
I. THE SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO COUNSEL
To someone unfamiliar with the U.S. Constitution, the idea that a court
would provide a defendant with representation seems strange. Indeed, in
the criminal context, the government itself is the adversary in court seeking
to deprive the defendant of his liberty. Therefore, a historical background of
the right to counsel and related concepts is necessary before one can
understand the more nuanced context of competency stage deprivations.
The Sixth Amendment provides that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his
defence.”5 The Supreme Court has traditionally provided two justifications
for this right.6 First, by providing counsel to criminal defendants, the
imbalance between the accused and the government within our adversarial
system is minimized.7 Second, and relatedly, providing counsel preserves
5 U.S. CONST. amend. VI. Also guaranteed within the amendment are the defendant’s rights
to a speedy and public trial, to an impartial jury, to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him, to confront the witnesses against him, and to have compulsory process in
obtaining witnesses in his favor. Id.
6 See Meredith B. Halama, Note, Loss of A Fundamental Right: The Sixth Amendment as a Mere
“Prophylactic Rule,” 1998 U. ILL. L. REV. 1207, 1209 (explaining the two related goals of the Sixth
Amendment’s right to counsel).
7 See United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 227 (1967) (“The presence of counsel . . . operates
to assure that the accused’s interests will be protected consistently with our adversary theory of
criminal prosecution.” (citation omitted)); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68-69 (1932) (“The
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the fairness and integrity of criminal trials.8 These justifications recognize
“the obvious truth that the average defendant does not have the professional
legal skill to protect himself when brought before a tribunal with [the]
power to take his life or liberty.”9 Because the American criminal justice
system is so complex, the Sixth Amendment is designed to protect the
layperson who may be unable to navigate effectively his or her defense
alone.10 With the defendant facing such high stakes, and being systematically
disadvantaged by a complicated system, the right to counsel is the Constitution’s chosen means to achieve some degree of parity at trial.11
A. Extension of the Right to Counsel to “Critical Stages”
Today, the Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches at all “critical
stages” of a criminal proceeding.12 The original understanding of the Sixth
Amendment’s protections, however, focused almost exclusively on the
criminal trial itself. After all, pretrial proceedings at the time of the Framers
“were insignificant.”13 But the changing nature of these proceedings over
time made it apparent that threats to the fairness and integrity of the

right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did not comprehend the right to be
heard by counsel.”).
8 See Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 168-69 (1985) (“The right to the assistance of counsel . . . is indispensable to the fair administration of our adversarial system of criminal justice.”);
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 685 (1984) (“The Sixth Amendment recognizes the right
to the assistance of counsel because it envisions counsel’s playing a role that is critical to the ability
of the adversarial system to produce just results.”).
9 Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462-63 (1938).
10 See Powell, 287 U.S. at 69 (“Even the intelligent and educated layman has small and sometimes no skill in the science of law.”); see also Maness v. Meyers, 419 U.S. 449, 466 (1975)
(explaining that a layman’s assertion of his rights “often depends upon legal advice from someone
who is trained and skilled in the subject matter”); Michael J. Howe, Note, Tomorrow’s Massiah:
Towards A “Prosecution Specific” Understanding of the Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel, 104 COLUM.
L. REV. 134, 134 (2004) (“The primary purpose of [the Sixth Amendment] is to help the layman
when confronted with the inherent complexity of the American system of criminal law.” (citing
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963); Powell, 287 U.S. at 68-69)).
11 See James J. Tomkovicz, Standards for Invocation and Waiver of Counsel in Confession Contexts,
71 IOWA L. REV. 975, 980 (1986) (“Approximate parity between the[] combatants is critical to
prevent unfair processes and unjust outcomes tainted by one side’s superiority.”).
12 See, e.g., Montejo v. Louisiana, 556 U.S. 778, 786 (2009) (citations omitted); Iowa v. Tovar,
541 U.S. 77, 80-81 (2004) (citations omitted); Moulton, 474 U.S. at 170 (citations omitted); Wade,
388 U.S. at 224.
13 Tomkovicz, supra note 11, at 982; see also United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 309 (1973)
(“[T]he core purpose of the counsel guarantee was to assure ‘Assistance’ at trial, when the accused
was confronted with both the intricacies of the law and the advocacy of the public prosecutor.”
(emphasis added)).
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criminal justice system were no longer limited to the trial itself.14 The
“changing patterns of criminal procedure” meant that pretrial events came
to resemble trial more closely, and the accused was being “confronted, just
as at trial, by the procedural system” much earlier than he was previously.15
To account for this change, the Supreme Court began to expand the scope
of Sixth Amendment protections to pretrial proceedings. As the Wade
Court explained,
When the Bill of Rights was adopted . . . . [t]he accused confronted the
prosecutor and the witnesses against him, and the evidence was marshalled,
largely at the trial itself. In contrast, today’s law enforcement machinery
involves critical confrontations of the accused by the prosecution at pretrial
proceedings where the results might well settle the accused’s fate and
reduce the trial itself to a mere formality. In recognition of these realities of
modern criminal prosecution, our cases have construed the Sixth
Amendment guarantee to . . . encompass[] counsel’s assistance whenever necessary to assure a meaningful “defence.”16

A series of cases during the 1960s and 1970s further clarified this contrast and highlighted the importance of representation at stages other than
the trial.17 The circumstances of these cases led to the development of what is
now identified as the critical stage doctrine, which expanded the scope of
the Sixth Amendment guarantee and the remedies for its violation. By the
time the Court penned its seminal critical stage opinion in United States v.
Cronic,18 a completely new Sixth Amendment analysis replaced the original
understandings of the guarantee.
The Supreme Court’s development of the critical stage doctrine began
in Hamilton v. Alabama.19 There, the defendant was not represented by

14 See Powell, 287 U.S. at 57 (identifying the period between a defendant’s arraignment and
his trial as “perhaps the most critical period of the proceedings”).
15 Ash, 413 U.S. at 310.
16 Wade, 388 U.S. at 224-25.
17 See, e.g., Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1970) (finding that a defendant was entitled
to the aid of counsel at a nonmandatory preliminary hearing); Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S.
201, 205-06 (1964) (holding that introducing into evidence incriminating statements obtained
postindictment in the absence of defense counsel violated the defendant’s Sixth Amendment
rights); White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59, 60 (1963) (per curiam) (reversing a conviction because
defendant was not represented by counsel at the preliminary hearing where he pleaded guilty);
Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52, 54-55 (1961) (holding that the absence of counsel at defendant’s
arraignment mandated reversal, whether or not prejudice resulted).
18 466 U.S. 648 (1984).
19 368 U.S. 52 (1961); see also Van v. Jones, 475 F.3d 292, 297 (6th Cir. 2007) (explaining that
the Court’s nationwide critical stage doctrine began in Hamilton).
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counsel during his arraignment and was subsequently sentenced to death.20
The Court explained that “[w]hatever may be the function and importance
of arraignment in other jurisdictions, we have said enough to show that in
Alabama it is a critical stage in a criminal proceeding. What happens there
may affect the whole trial.”21 Because the arraignment was a “critical stage,”
the Court refused to “stop to determine whether prejudice resulted.”22
Rather, a defense may have been “irretrievably lost” due to the absence of
counsel, so the defendant was not required to prove that he actually suffered
a disadvantage.23 The Court unanimously reversed the Alabama Supreme
Court’s denial of the defendant’s writ of error coram nobis, and the term
“critical stage” entered Sixth Amendment jurisprudence.24
It was not long before the Court identified other “critical stages.” In a
per curiam opinion, the Court in White v. Maryland applied Hamilton to
identify a Maryland preliminary hearing as a critical stage where the right
to counsel attaches.25 One year later, in Massiah v. United States, the Court
found it impermissible to use a defendant’s “incriminating words” against
him at trial, because “federal agents had deliberately elicited [the words]
from him after he had been indicted and in the absence of his counsel.”26
Because counsel presumably would have objected or guided the defendant
toward a more favorable result, evidence acquired without counsel should
never have been admitted.27 The expansion continued in United States v.
Wade, where the Supreme Court held that a postindictment, pretrial lineup
constituted a critical stage where counsel is necessary.28 And in Mempa v.
Rhay, the Court found a defendant’s deferred sentencing hearing to be a
critical stage.29 Finally, in Holloway v. Arkansas, Justice Berger’s opinion
emphasized that the “mere physical presence” of counsel does not
automatically amount to the representation guaranteed by the Sixth
20
21
22
23
24
25

Hamilton, 368 U.S. at 52-53.
Id. at 54.
Id. at 55.
Id. at 54-55.
Id. at 53, 55.
373 U.S. 59, 59-60 (1963) (per curiam) (noting that “[o]nly the presence of counsel could
have enabled this accused to know all the defenses available to him and to plead intelligently”
(quoting Hamilton, 368 U.S. at 55) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
26 377 U.S. 201, 206 (1964).
27 Id. at 204, 206 (recognizing that “a Constitution which guarantees a defendant the aid of
counsel at . . . trial could surely vouchsafe no less to an indicted defendant under interrogation by
the police in a completely extrajudicial proceeding”).
28 388 U.S. 218, 236-37 (1967) (explaining that there is “grave potential for prejudice” in a
pretrial lineup and that the “presence of counsel itself can often avert [such] prejudice”).
29 389 U.S. 128, 135-37 (1967) (raising concerns that certain legal rights, such as the right to
appeal, could be lost if not properly exercised at this stage).
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Amendment.30 Because the trial court compelled the defense attorney in the
case to jointly represent at trial three different defendants with conflicting
interests, it had effectively “sealed his lips on crucial matters.”31 The Court
concluded that the defense attorney’s physical presence, burdened by
“conflicting obligations,” was analogous to a complete absence of counsel in
violation of the Sixth Amendment.32 After Holloway, critical stages encompassed a full range of confrontations from pretrial to sentencing, whether
counsel was physically present or not.
One entire category of nontrial proceedings—a category particularly
relevant to this Comment—was notably absent from the Supreme Court’s
two-decade expansion of the critical stage doctrine: mental health determinations. But, in Estelle v. Smith,33 the Court offered its first definitive
guidance on the subject. There, a doctor who examined the defendant
before trial was not included on the State’s expected witness list.34 At the
penalty phase, however, the doctor was called as a witness—over defense
counsel’s objection—to testify regarding the defendant’s mental health.35 In
his testimony, which “was based on information derived from his 90-minute
‘mental status examination,’” the doctor claimed that the defendant presented
a continuing danger to the community.36 After this testimony—which was
the only testimony presented by the State—the jury sentenced the defendant to death.37
The Estelle Court found that the defendant’s “Sixth Amendment right to
counsel clearly had attached when [the doctor] examined him at the Dallas
County Jail, and their interview proved to be a ‘critical stage’ of the aggregate proceedings against respondent.”38 Because the “defendant should not
be forced to resolve such an important issue without ‘the guiding hand of
counsel,’” the Court found that the “psychiatric examination . . . proceeded
in violation of respondent’s Sixth Amendment right to the assistance of
counsel.”39 Importantly, Estelle dealt only with a defendant’s consent to a
mental health interview, not the actual interview itself. But the lesson

30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39

435 U.S. 475, 489-90 (1978).
Id. at 490.
Id. at 489-90.
451 U.S. 454 (1981).
Id. at 459.
Id.
Id. at 459-60.
Id. at 460.
Id. at 470 (citations omitted).
Id. at 471 (quoting Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932)).
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remained that where an event proved to be critical to the aggregate proceeding,
a conviction secured without counsel would not stand.
B. Cronic: When “Being There” Is Not Enough
While the Supreme Court’s two-decade development of critical stage
doctrine greatly expanded the realm of possible Sixth Amendment violations, deprivations during these stages lacked their own, distinct method of
analysis. Certain critical stage violations were held to be prejudicial per se,
while others were analyzed under the “harmless error” standard.40 In 1984,
however, the Supreme Court addressed this lack of uniformity in United
States v. Cronic.41 The decision provided an exception to the prejudice
requirement of ineffective assistance claims where circumstances exist “that
are so likely to prejudice the accused” that even litigating over their effect
would be “unjustified.”42
In Cronic, the defendant was indicted for mail fraud following a nearly
five-year federal investigation.43 After his retained counsel withdrew, the
court appointed an inexperienced attorney with a real estate practice to
represent him only twenty-five days before trial.44 The defendant was
convicted and sentenced to twenty-five years in prison.45 But the Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed the conviction after finding that the
defendant “did not have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence that is
guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution.”46 According to
the Supreme Court,

40 Compare United States v. Smith, 411 F.2d 733, 737 (6th Cir. 1969) (“It is not necessary that
this Court determine whether defendant was prejudiced in fact, but only that he was ‘exposed to a
reasonable possibility of prejudice in fact.’” (citation omitted)), with In re Di Bella, 518 F.2d 955,
959 (2d Cir. 1975) (“Despite the broad language of such cases as Hamilton v. Alabama, the absence
of counsel at a ‘critical stage’ of a proceeding does not always require a finding of prejudice per se.
In some instances, the harmless-error rule of Chapman v. California is applicable.” (citations
omitted)). For an articulation of the harmless error rule, see Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24
(1967) (“[B]efore a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must be able to
declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.”).
41 466 U.S. 648 (1984).
42 Id. at 658; see also Wright v. Van Patten, 552 U.S. 120, 124 (2008) (per curiam) (“Cronic
‘recognized a narrow exception to Strickland’s holding that a defendant who asserts ineffective
assistance of counsel must demonstrate not only that his attorney’s performance was deficient, but
also that the deficiency prejudiced the defense.’” (quoting Florida v. Nixon, 543 U.S. 175, 190
(2004))).
43 466 U.S. at 649.
44 Id.
45 Id. at 649-50.
46 Id. at 650 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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[t]his conclusion was not supported by a determination that respondent’s
trial counsel had made any specified errors, that his actual performance had
prejudiced the defense, or that he failed to exercise “the skill, judgment, and
diligence of a reasonably competent defense attorney”; instead the conclusion rested on the premise that no such showing is necessary “when circumstances hamper a given lawyer’s preparation of a defendant’s case.”47

The Tenth Circuit found that ineffectiveness could be inferred from, among
other factors, the lawyer’s lack of experience and preparation time when
compared to the complexity of the case.48 However, a unanimous Supreme
Court reversed.49 In considering an ineffective assistance of counsel claim,
the Court explained, a lawyer’s actual conduct and “specific errors” must be
considered.50
However, Cronic is better known for articulating the exceptions to this
rule. The Court stated that demonstrating specific errors (“specificity”)
would not be necessary where “surrounding circumstances justify a
presumption of ineffectiveness.”51 Under these circumstances, a “Sixth
Amendment claim [would] be sufficient without inquiry into counsel’s actual
performance.”52 Far from providing a broad exception, the only types of
circumstances that could justify this exception were limited to those “so
likely to prejudice the accused that the cost of litigating their effect in a
particular case [would be] unjustified.”53 Writing for the Court, Justice
Stevens provided three circumstances that would satisfy this exception.54
First, the complete denial of counsel would per se violate the Sixth
Amendment’s guarantee.55 Second, counsel’s total failure “to subject the
prosecution’s case to meaningful adversarial testing” would be “a denial of
Sixth Amendment rights that makes the adversary process itself presumptively unreliable.”56 Finally, a Sixth Amendment violation would be found
where, although counsel “assist[s] the accused during trial, the likelihood
that any lawyer, even a fully competent one, could provide effective assistance
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56

Id. (citation omitted).
Id. at 652.
Id. at 666-67.
Id. at 666.
Id. at 662.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id. at 658.
Id. at 659-60.
Id. at 659.
Id. at 659. As an example, the Court noted that where a defendant is “denied the right of
effective cross-examination,” it “would be constitutional error of the first magnitude and no
amount of showing of want of prejudice would cure it.” Id. (quoting Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308,
318 (1974)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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is so small that a presumption of prejudice is appropriate.”57 Cronic therefore
applies only “where a criminal defendant was actually or constructively
denied counsel,” not where he solely alleges that his representation was
inadequate.58 In other words, if any of the three circumstances outlined in
Cronic were found to exist, a defendant’s conviction and sentence would not
stand.
Cronic’s exception to Strickland prejudice analysis, which requires a showing
that “counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness” and that the error prejudiced the judgment,59 was expanded before
the ink dried on the opinion. In Kimmelman v. Morrison, the Court distinguished between cases like Cronic and those alleging “actual ineffectiveness,”
explaining that “the defendant must prove both incompetence and prejudice” only where “the defendant alleges ‘actual’ ineffective assistance rather
than the few contexts where ineffective assistance is ‘presumed,’ such as
where counsel is either totally absent or prevented from assisting the
accused during a critical stage.”60 After Morrison, it was clear that allegations
of actual ineffective assistance were distinct from allegations under circumstances where prejudice would be presumed under Cronic. That is, Sixth
Amendment claims under Cronic were no longer subject to the substantive
review for prejudice mandated by Strickland.61
A more recent case, Bell v. Cone, reaffirmed this distinction.62 There, the
Court again considered allegations of “actual” ineffective assistance of
counsel. In its opinion below, the Sixth Circuit conflated the Cronic and
Strickland standards, performing the analysis required by the latter while
using the reasoning and legal standard of the former.63 The Supreme Court
57 Id. at 659-60 (identifying Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932), as an example of this type
of case).
58 Ronald A. Parsons, Jr., Being There: Constructive Denial of Counsel at a Competency Hearing
as Structural Error Under the Sixth Amendment, 56 S.D. L. REV. 238, 241 (2011).
59 See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88, 691-92 (1984) (holding that “deficiencies in counsel’s performance must be prejudicial to the defense in order to constitute ineffective
assistance under the Constitution” but noting that prejudice may be presumed in certain contexts).
60 477 U.S. 365, 381 & n.6 (1986) (emphasis added).
61 See, e.g., Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 88-89 (1988) (citing Cronic and explaining that it
would be “inappropriate to apply . . . the prejudice requirement of Strickland” where new counsel
was not appointed after initial counsel withdrew, leaving “petitioner completely without representation during the appellate court’s actual decisional process”).
62 535 U.S. 685, 695-98 (2002) (discussing whether the principles of Cronic or Strickland
should govern respondent’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim).
63 Cone v. Bell, 243 F.3d 961, 979 (6th Cir. 2001) (noting that “Cone need not show actual
prejudice” under Cronic, yet applying the Strickland analysis to conclude that his attorney’s failure
to present mitigating evidence or make a final argument “fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness and prejudiced him”).
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quoted Cronic’s three exceptional circumstances in which prejudice can be
presumed64 and explained that all other deprivation claims would be
analyzed under Strickland.65
II. COMPETENCY HEARINGS AS A CRITICAL STAGE
By this point, the reader should have a basic understanding of the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel, as well as the development of the critical
stage concept that mandates its application in certain contexts. However,
the question remains: where do competency hearings fit within this
framework? The answer is that competency hearings have never been
declared “critical stages” by the Supreme Court, and therefore, whether the
Sixth Amendment guarantee applies during this stage remains an open
question. Nevertheless, competence has been addressed extensively by other
areas of the law (and by circuit courts), and an understanding of these
historical origins helps to inform the current discussion.
Competence is a topic that “lie[s] at the intersection of psychiatry, constitutional law, and criminal procedure.”66 From the common law67 to the
Constitution,68 and through rules of criminal procedure69 to federal legislation,70 incompetent defendants have long been protected from the perils of
facing trial. Perhaps the most important source of protection is the Constitution itself. A defendant’s right to proffer a defense in his case is guaranteed by the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments.71 The protections of
64
65

Bell, 535 U.S. at 695-96.
Id. at 696-98 (finding that counsel’s conduct did not fall within a Cronic exception and was
“plainly of the same ilk as other specific attorney errors we have held subject to Strickland’s
performance and prejudice components”).
66 Brett F. Kinney, Comment, An Incompetent Jurisprudence: The Burden of Proof in Competency
Hearings, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 683, 688 (2009). See generally MICHAEL L. PERLIN ET AL.,
COMPETENCE IN THE LAW: FROM LEGAL THEORY TO C LINICAL APPLICATION (2008)
(exploring the intersection of law and mental health).
67 See, e.g., Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 445-46 (1992) (explaining that common law
principles provided the foundation for the prohibition on incompetent defendants facing trial in
modern criminal procedure); Youtsey v. United States, 97 F. 937, 940-46 (6th Cir. 1899) (cataloging
the prohibition’s history).
68 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (providing due process rights).
69 See, e.g., Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 396 (1993) (explaining that the competency of a
criminal defendant must be established before trial (citing Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 378
(1966))); Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 171-72 (1975) (“For our purposes, it suffices to note that
the prohibition [against subjecting an incompetent person to trial] is fundamental to an adversary
system of justice.”).
70 See 18 U.S.C. § 4241 (2012) (establishing a system of competency hearings and civil
confinement for defendants whose competency to stand trial is questioned).
71 See U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law . . . .”); id. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
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the Due Process Clause, found in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments,
have also been interpreted to prohibit incompetent defendants from standing
trial.72
Many trace these constitutional limits back to the traditional ban on trials
in absentia, which prohibited trying an incompetent defendant who,
although physically present in the court room, was not sufficiently mentally
present to defend himself against the charges he faced.73 Although competency
as a standard does not lend itself to a one-size-fits-all definition, the
Supreme Court’s treatment of competency has been consistent with these
traditional roots. In Dusky v. United States, the Court articulated a concrete
test for competence, agreeing with the Solicitor General’s suggestion that
“the test must be whether [a defendant] has sufficient present ability to
consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding—
and whether he has a rational as well as factual understanding of the
proceedings against him.”74 If questions are raised regarding a defendant’s
ability to satisfy this test, the trial court must hold a competency hearing.75
Specifically, a defendant is subject to a competency hearing “where evidence
from any source, including the trial judge’s own doubts about the defendant’s
competence, raises a ‘bona fide doubt’ as to the defendant’s competency.”76
A trial judge has the discretion to determine whether a bona fide doubt
exists and is able to draw inferences from the defendant’s own conduct as
enjoy the right to . . . have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.”); id. amend. XIV, § 1
(“[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law . . . .”); Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19 (1967) (finding the right to present a defense to
be “a fundamental element of due process of law”).
72 See Buchanan v. Kentucky, 483 U.S. 402, 434 n.6 (1987) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“The
right to be tried and convicted only if legally competent inheres in the Fourteenth Amendment,
and thus implicates constitutional principles in addition to the Fifth and Sixth Amendment
requirements . . . .” (citing Pate, 383 U.S. at 378)).
73 See, e.g., Caleb Foote, A Comment on Pre-Trial Commitment of Criminal Defendants, 108 U.
PA. L. REV. 832, 834 (1960) (“The competency rule did not evolve from philosophical notions of
punishability, but rather has deep roots in the common law as a by-product of the ban against trials
in absentia . . . .”); see also Kinney, supra note 66, at 689 (“The prohibition [on incompetent
defendants standing trial] may have stemmed from the ban on trials in absentia.”). See generally
FED. R. CRIM. P. 43(a) (“[T]he defendant must be present at . . . every trial stage, including jury
impanelment and the return of the verdict . . . .”).
74 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks omitted).
75 See 18 U.S.C. § 4241(a) (2012) (requiring a competency hearing if the court at any time has
“reasonable cause” to believe that the defendant may be mentally incompetent).
76 40 AM. JUR. 2D Proof of Facts § 171 (1984); see also Pate, 383 U.S. at 385 (“Where the evidence raises a ‘bona fide doubt’ as to a defendant’s competence to stand trial, the judge on his own
motion must impanel a jury and conduct a sanity hearing . . . .”); People v. Leiker, 450 N.E.2d 37,
40 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983) (citing Pate for the proposition that “[t]he failure to follow procedures
adequate to protect a defendant’s right not to be tried while incompetent violates the defendant’s
due process rights”).
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well as outside information.77 Importantly, if a defendant is found to be
incompetent, he will not face charges until his competency is restored, if at
all.78 Therefore, the outcome of a competency hearing is clearly of great
consequence to a defendant’s fate. But the following question remains: is a
defendant’s competency hearing a critical stage at which the Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches?
The Supreme Court has yet to provide an answer to this question;
“[h]owever, every federal court of appeals to take up the question has
answered it affirmatively.”79 After all, “[t]he Supreme Court has defined
critical stages as those proceedings between an individual and agents of the
State . . . that amount to trial-like confrontations, at which counsel would
help the accused in coping with legal problems or . . . meeting his adversary,
and hold significant consequences for the accused.”80 The trial-type
proceedings and serious consequences characteristic of competency hearings
leave little doubt that such hearings are covered by the critical stage doctrine. Therefore, as with any other “critical stage,” the Sixth Amendment
right to the assistance of counsel attaches at a competency hearing. However, although the right to counsel is not absolute, and defendants are normally
free to decline such assistance,81 competency hearings are different. There,
the Sixth Amendment guarantee becomes a mandate.

77 See, e.g., Watts v. Singletary, 87 F.3d 1282, 1287 (11th Cir. 1996) (finding that a criminal
defendant failed to establish a bona fide doubt as to his competency even though he was conspicuously asleep during approximately seventy percent of his murder trial); Hance v. Zant, 696 F.2d
940, 948 (11th Cir. 1983) (explaining that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion by not holding
a competency hearing where “there was scant evidence before the trial court that [defendant] had a
history of irrational behavior”), overruled on other grounds by Brooks v. Kemp, 762 F.2d 1383 (11th
Cir. 1985); Daniel v. Thigpen, 742 F. Supp. 1535, 1548 (M.D. Ala. 1990) (holding that defendant’s
trial conduct “was not so unusual . . . that it should have raised a bona fide doubt on the part of the
trial court that would have required it to conduct a Pate hearing”).
78 See generally 18 U.S.C. § 4241(d)-(e) (2012) (providing for a system of evaluation,
treatment, and discharge of mentally incompetent defendants).
79 Parsons, supra note 58, at 242 & n.31 (citing Raymond v. Weber, 552 F.3d 680, 684 (8th Cir.
2009); United States v. Collins, 430 F.3d 1260, 1264 (10th Cir. 2005); Appel v. Horn, 250 F.3d 203,
215 (3d Cir. 2001); United States v. Klat, 156 F.3d 1258, 1262 (D.C. Cir. 1998); United States v.
Barfield, 969 F.2d 1554, 1556 (4th Cir. 1992); Sturgis v. Goldsmith, 796 F.2d 1103, 1108-09 (9th Cir.
1986)); see also United States v. Ross, 703 F.3d 856, 874 (6th Cir. 2012) (citing Parsons’s article and
explicitly joining the other circuits in finding a competency hearing to be a critical stage).
80 Parsons, supra note 58, at 241 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
81 See Iowa v. Tovar, 541 U.S. 77, 87-88 (2004) (“A person accused of crime, however, may
choose to forgo representation . . . . [T]he Constitution ‘does not force a lawyer upon a defendant.’” (citation omitted)); Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 820 (1975) (“The language and spirit
of the Sixth Amendment contemplate that counsel . . . shall be an aid to a willing defendant—not
an organ of the State interposed between an unwilling defendant and his right to defend himself
personally.”).
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Before permitting a defendant to waive his right to counsel, a court must
ensure that the accused is “knowingly and intelligently [choosing to] forgo
those relinquished benefits.”82 A defendant’s waiver must, in general, be
“knowing, voluntary, and intelligent.”83 In addition to this requirement, the
trial court must find that the defendant “actually does understand the
significance and consequences of a particular decision” and that his waiver is
“uncoerced.”84 But the circumstances that lead a trial court to question a
defendant’s competence—and thus to hold a competency hearing—directly
undermine his ability to validly waive his right to counsel. Unlike other
“critical stages” in a criminal proceeding, a competency hearing is meant to
examine the defendant’s mental state and establish (or find lacking) the very
abilities necessary for him to enter a valid waiver. Only if a defendant “has a
rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him” can
he decide to waive his right to counsel.85 As a result, unless a defendant’s
competence is confirmed at a hearing, he cannot be said to “knowingly,
voluntarily, and intelligently” consent to waiver. The mirror version of that
statement is easier to understand: how can a defendant, found by a court to
be incompetent, also be permitted to represent himself in that same court?86
He cannot.

82 Karl Evan Strauss, Between the Defendant’s Scylla and Charybdis: Brooks v. McCaughtry and
the Right to a Fair Trial and the Right to Self-Representation, 37 U. TOL. L. REV. 235, 245 (2005)
(quoting Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835) (internal quotation marks omitted).
83 53 AM. JUR. 2D Mentally Impaired Persons § 36 (2006); see Kenneth S. Sogabe, Note, Exercising the Right to Self-Representation in United States v. Farhad: Issues in Waiving a Criminal
Defendant’s Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel, 30 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 129, 136 & n.52
(2000) (citing Faretta for the “right to waive” counsel and the “right to self-representation”); see
also David C. Donehue, Note, Peters v. Gunn: Should the Illiterate Defendant Have a Right to SelfRepresentation?, 57 U. PITT. L. REV. 211, 214 (1995) (citing Faretta for the proposition that before a
defendant can waive his right to counsel, the record must establish that “he knows what he is
doing and his choice is made with eyes open” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
84 Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 401 n.12 (1993); see Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164, 17778 (2008) (permitting separate standards for competency to stand trial and competency to proceed
pro se); see also Alan R. Felthous, The Right to Represent Oneself Incompetently: Competency to Waive
Counsel and Conduct One’s Own Defense Before and After Godinez, 18 MENTAL & PHYSICAL
DISABILITY L. REP. 105, 108-09 (1994) (citing Godinez and distinguishing competency generally
from the competency necessary to enter a guilty plea or waive the right to counsel).
85 Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
86 See United States v. Klat, 156 F.3d 1258, 1263 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (“[I]t [is] contradictory to
conclude that a defendant whose competency is reasonably in question could nevertheless
knowingly and intelligently waive her Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Such a defendant may
not proceed pro se until the question of her competency to stand trial has been resolved.”); see also
United States v. Purnett, 910 F.2d 51, 55 (2d Cir. 1990) (“Logically, the trial court cannot
simultaneously question a defendant’s mental competence to stand trial and at one and the same
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Recognizing this internal inconsistency, every circuit to consider the
issue has held that a competency hearing is a critical stage at which the
defendant must be represented by counsel.87 At any point in the trial, even
if the defendant previously proceeded pro se, “[w]hen a defendant’s mental
ability to waive the right to counsel and exercise the right of selfrepresentation has been brought into reasonable question, the trial court
must therefore hold a competency hearing to determine the proper
course.”88 In such a case, the “defendant may not proceed pro se until the
question of her competency to stand trial has been resolved.”89 But the
Sixth Amendment guarantee is not satisfied simply by the physical presence
of a lawyer at a defendant’s competency hearing.90 As Ronald Parsons
explains in his article on constructive denial of counsel, “courts have recognized in such circumstances that a lawyer simply ‘being there’ is not
enough.”91 Regardless of whether a physically present lawyer fails to provide
the requisite degree of representation, or whether a defendant is simply not
represented during his competency hearing, recognizing that a deprivation
has occurred does not end the court’s analysis. A remedy must follow.
III. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT OVER THE APPROPRIATE REMEDY
FOR A COMPETENCY STAGE DEPRIVATION
As we have seen, circuit courts uniformly apply the Cronic standard—not
the Strickland prejudice standard—when analyzing allegations of competency
stage deprivations. This uniformity, however, does not extend to the courts’
choices of an appropriate remedy.92 This Part examines the circuit split over
time be convinced that the defendant has knowingly and intelligently waived his right to
counsel.”).
87 See supra note 79 and accompanying text; see also Edwards, 554 U.S. at 178 (“[T]he Constitution permits States to insist upon representation by counsel for those competent enough to
stand trial under Dusky but who still suffer from severe mental illness to the point where they are
not competent to conduct trial proceedings by themselves.”).
88 Parsons, supra note 58, at 239.
89 Id. at 242.
90 See United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 659 (1984) (explaining that counsel’s total failure
“to subject the prosecution’s case to meaningful adversarial testing” would be “a denial of Sixth
Amendment rights that makes the adversary process itself presumptively unreliable”); Holloway v.
Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 489-90 (1978) (explaining that being physically present is not enough
when an attorney is representing multiple defendants with conflicting interests).
91 Parsons, supra note 58, at 239.
92 Compare United States v. Bergman, 599 F.3d 1142, 1148-49 (10th Cir. 2010) (remanding for
an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the district court can make a retrospective competency
determination), and United States v. Klat, 156 F.3d 1258, 1264 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (remanding for an
evidentiary hearing to determine whether the presence of counsel would have altered the result of
the competency hearing), with United States v. Ross, 703 F.3d 856, 874 (6th Cir. 2012) (concluding
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the proper remedy for competency stage deprivations. Using two courts of
appeals decisions as examples, I explain the two distinct remedies courts
choose. While this Comment ultimately advocates for the use of one over
the other, an understanding of both remedies and their justifications is
critical in order to make a meaningful distinction between them.
A. The United States v. Klat Approach: Evidentiary Hearings
United States v. Klat93 came to the D.C. Circuit with a rich factual history.
In 1996, the defendant, Susan Viola Klat, was indicted on two counts of
threatening to assault Chief Justice Rehnquist and William Suter, the Clerk
of the Supreme Court, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 115 and 1114.94 Her
threatening voice messages, letters, and statements about both men were
intended as retaliation for their performance in their official capacities.95
Klat repeatedly asserted her desire to represent herself at trial. Her
request was eventually granted when appointed counsel filed a motion to
withdraw, partly as a response to Klat filing a separate civil suit against
him.96 During a district court hearing, however, the judge found Klat’s
behavior sufficiently “bizarre” to provide the “reasonable cause” necessary to
evaluate her competence under 18 U.S.C. § 4241(b).97 Despite granting
appointed counsel’s motion to withdraw, the district court failed to appoint
new counsel.98 At the formal competency hearing, Klat was found competent and able to continue representing herself at trial.99 During this same
hearing, she agreed to have standby counsel appointed for the remainder of
the proceeding.100
At trial, Klat delivered an opening statement and cross-examined two
witnesses before refusing to continue pro se because she felt “too emotional.”101 Thereafter, standby counsel represented her during the remainder of
the trial and sentencing.102 The jury found Klat guilty on both counts, and

that the proper remedy for a finding of ineffective assistance of counsel at a competency hearing is
an automatic reversal), and Appel v. Horn, 250 F.3d 203, 217-18 (3d Cir. 2001) (same).
93 156 F.3d 1258 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
94 Id. at 1260-61.
95 Id. at 1260.
96 Id. at 1261.
97 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
98 Id.
99 Id. at 1262.
100 Id.
101 Id.
102 Id.
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she was subsequently sentenced to fifty-seven months’ imprisonment, to
run concurrently, for each count.103
On appeal to the D.C. Circuit, Klat alleged that the district court erred
by “allowing her to appear pro se at a hearing to determine her competency
to stand trial.”104 The D.C. Circuit explained that Klat, like every criminal
defendant, had the “right to counsel at every critical stage of [her] criminal
prosecution.”105 Relying on precedent,106 the court stated that a competency
hearing constitutes a critical stage at which the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel attaches.107 But competency hearings were different. Although Klat
was permitted to waive her right to counsel during other “critical stages,”
the court reasoned that “where a defendant’s competence to stand trial is
reasonably in question, a court may not allow that defendant to waive her
right to counsel and proceed pro se until the issue of competency has been
resolved.”108 Because competence is a prerequisite to waiving counsel, the
court found it is “contradictory to conclude that a defendant whose competency is reasonably in question could nevertheless knowingly and intelligently waive her Sixth Amendment right to counsel.”109 Rejecting the
remainder of Klat’s claims, the D.C. Circuit found that the district court
erred when it allowed her to proceed pro se during her competency hearing.110
The panel next acknowledged that remedies were an unsettled issue.111
While “some constitutional rights [are] so basic to a fair trial that their
infraction can never be treated as harmless error,”112 the court explained, not
“all non-trial denials of counsel require automatic reversal of a defendant’s
conviction.”113 Instead, the court stated that under certain conditions, the
proper remedy is to remand for an evidentiary hearing under the Chapman
standard.114 The court explained that an automatic reversal was only appropriate where “the deprivation of the right to counsel affected—and

103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111
112

Id.
Id. at 1260.
Id. at 1262.
See United States v. Byers, 740 F.2d 1104, 1119 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en banc).
Klat, 156 F.3d at 1262.
Id. at 1262-63 (footnote omitted).
Id. at 1263.
Id. at 1260, 1263.
Id. at 1263-64.
Id. at 1263 (quoting Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 23 (1967)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
113 Id. (referencing Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 11 (1970), where the Supreme Court
“remanded the case to the state court to determine whether the denial of counsel at the preliminary hearing was harmless error under Chapman v. California” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
114 Id. at 1263-64.
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contaminated—the entire criminal proceeding.”115 In order to determine
whether Klat’s case met that condition, the court remanded “for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the competency hearing could have
come out differently if appellant had been represented by counsel.”116
Explaining that the purpose of the retrospective hearing was only to
determine whether a lawyer could have changed the outcome of the competency hearing—not to determine if Klat was in fact competent—the court
reasoned that the effects of the deprivation of counsel could potentially be
limited to that stage of the proceeding.117 This approach will hereinafter be
identified as the “Klat approach,” referring to the use of evidentiary hearings
to determine prejudice. Not all circuits are willing to endorse its use.
B. The United States v. Ross Approach: Automatic Reversals
A sophisticated securities conspiracy gave rise to United States v. Ross.118
The five defendants in the case concocted a scheme to buy motor vehicles
from private sellers in exchange for counterfeit “official checks” and then
resell those vehicles before the sellers realized that the checks were worthless.119
The prosecution described Bryan Ross as the defendant who “conceived the
scheme” and was “primarily responsible for orchestrating” it.120
Prior to the start of trial, three court-appointed attorneys withdrew
because of Ross’s “bizarre and paranoid behavior.”121 After several demands,
Ross’s request to proceed pro se was granted.122 Standby counsel was also
appointed.123 The Government promptly filed—and the court granted—a
motion for a competency examination and hearing.124 At the competency
hearing, the court found Ross to be competent based on its own observations and a clinical report prepared by a court-appointed psychologist.125
However, Ross was not provided with full-time counsel during the competency hearing.126 In fact, standby counsel withdrew, and the court appointed

115 Id. at 1264 (quoting Satterwhite v. Texas, 486 U.S. 249, 257 (1988)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
116 Id.
117 Id.
118 703 F.3d 856, 865 (6th Cir. 2012).
119 Id.
120 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
121 Id.
122 Id. at 865-66.
123 Id. at 866.
124 Id.
125 Id.
126 Id.
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yet another attorney to serve as standby counsel.127 Ross continued to
represent himself for the remainder of the proceedings, including trial.128
When the jury returned its verdict, Ross was sentenced to imprisonment on
various counts.129 He received one sixty month sentence for the conspiracy
conviction and five seventy-eight month sentences for each substantive
count, all to be served concurrently.130 Ross appealed both his conviction
and sentence to the Sixth Circuit.131
The Sixth Circuit found that the district court erred when it did not
reappoint counsel to represent Ross while his competency was in dispute.132
Following other circuits, the court held that a competency hearing was a
critical stage.133 Indeed, “a psychological impairment would go to the
question of whether the waiver of counsel was knowing and intelligent.”134
Therefore, the district court’s failure to appoint full-time counsel to represent Ross at the hearing and inform him of his rights to testify, present
evidence, subpoena witnesses, and confront and cross-examine witnesses
“den[ied] the court the ability to ensure Ross knowingly waived those
rights.”135 Without a knowing or voluntary waiver, the district court erred
when it did not reappoint full-time counsel at Ross’s competency hearing.136
The remedy discussion was complicated, however, by the possibility that
Ross’s standby representation was satisfactory under the circumstances
articulated in Cronic. As the court explained, “[a]lthough Ross’s standby
counsel did not present argument during the competency hearing, it is
conceivable that he did satisfy the minimum standard by adequately investigating, undertaking appropriate preparation for the hearing and then
making an independent, strategic decision not to contest competency.”137
Putting this issue aside, the Ross court’s decision on the appropriate remedy
differed dramatically from the decision in Klat.

127
128
129
130
131
132
133
134

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 873-74.
Id. at 867 (quoting United States v. Kidwell, 217 F. App’x 441, 446 (6th Cir. 2007)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
135 Id. at 869.
136 Id. (“[A] defendant cannot represent himself at his own competency hearing, the purpose
of which is to determine whether a defendant understands and can participate in the proceedings
in the first place.”).
137 Id. at 873.
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First, the panel reiterated that “a complete absence of counsel at a critical stage of a criminal proceeding is a per se Sixth Amendment violation
warranting reversal of a conviction, a sentence, or both, as applicable,
without analysis for prejudice or harmless error.”138 Second, the court saw
“no reason to create an exception to our established rule that complete
deprivation of counsel during a critical stage warrants automatic reversal
without consideration of prejudice.”139 Stopping far short of requiring a
separate hearing to determine whether the absence of full-time counsel
actually resulted in prejudice, the court mandated automatic reversal if the
Cronic standard was not satisfied.140 If on remand the district court found
that Ross had been deprived of counsel under Cronic, “the conviction and
sentence [would be] vacated.”141 Analysis for prejudice was inappropriate.
The Ross court’s decision to order an automatic reversal when a criminal
defendant is deprived of counsel at his competency hearing was grounded in
statutory and constitutional interpretation. Indeed, reliance on such
authorities is expected in a federal court of appeals. When federal courts
settle on the proper remedy in these cases, however, alternative reasoning
may also be at play. Through contractual, practical, and behavioral analysis,
the Ross automatic reversal approach appears to be superior to the Klat
evidentiary hearings approach. The next Part examines the remedy question
through these alternative lenses, explaining the benefits and limitations of
each.
IV. THREE ARGUMENTS FOR CHOOSING AUTOMATIC REVERSALS
A. The Bargaining Theory and Its Pro Se Contract
When a criminal defendant is deprived of counsel at his competency
hearing, the remedy should be an automatic reversal. The civil treatment of
incompetence under contract law provides a useful lens through which one
may arrive at this conclusion. The majority contract rule of incompetence is
that “an incompetent person’s transactions are voidable.”142 The rule is
138 Id. at 873-74 (quoting Van v. Jones, 475 F.3d 292, 311-12 (6th Cir. 2007)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
139 Id. at 874.
140 Id.
141 Id.
142 5 S AMUEL W ILLISTON & R ICHARD A. L ORD , A T REATISE ON THE L AW OF
C ONTRACTS § 10:3 (4th ed. 2009); see also Ortelere v. Teachers’ Ret. Bd. of N.Y., 250 N.E.2d 460,
464 (N.Y. 1969) (“The well-established rule is that contracts of a mentally incompetent person . . . are voidable. Even where the contract has been partly or fully performed it will still be
avoided upon restoration of the status quo.”).
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rooted in the requirement that for contracts to be bargained-for, “parties to
them [must] have the psychological and intellectual capacity to understand
and evaluate the consequences of their agreements.”143 As Professor
Eisenberg explains,
[a] party (the “promisee”) who induces another (the “promisor”) to make a
bargain on unfair terms by exploiting the latter’s incapacity has acted in a
manner that violates conventional moral standards. . . . Efficiency considerations also fail to support application of the bargain principle in such
cases. The maxim that a promisor is the best judge of his own utility can
have little application: by hypothesis, the promisor is not able to make a
well-informed judgment concerning the transaction.144

Importantly, a contracting party’s capacity at the time of the execution of
the contract determines his ability or inability to make the agreement.145
The majority rule recognizes that contracting with an incompetent party is
neither fair nor efficient and shifts the costs of noncompliance to the
definitively competent party.
Proceeding pro se should be viewed as a continuing contractual
relationship between the defendant and the court. Just like a traditional
contract for goods or services, a defendant’s waiver of his right to counsel
must be “knowing, voluntary, and intelligent.”146 Indeed, similar to the
requirements for contractual capacity, a trial court must find that a pro se
defendant “actually does understand the significance and consequences of a
particular decision.”147 Therefore, where a defendant is the subject of a
competency hearing and the trial court errs by allowing him to proceed
143 Michael Wayne Brooks, Case Note, Kids Waiving Goodbye to Their Rights: An Argument
Against Juveniles’ Ability to Waive Their Right to Remain Silent During Police Interrogations, 13 GEO.
MASON L. REV. 219, 229 (2004) (quoting ROBERT E. SCOTT & JODY S. KRAUS, CONTRACT
LAW AND THEORY 481 (3d ed. 2002)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
144 Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Bargain Principle and Its Limits, 95 HARV. L. REV. 741, 76566 (1982).
145 See 17A C.J.S. Contracts § 141 (1999) (“The mental incapacity, or unsoundness of mind,
that affects the validity of a contract must be of the time at which the transaction occurs,
regardless of previous or subsequent insanity.” (footnotes omitted)).
146 53 AM. JUR. 2D Mentally Impaired Persons § 36 (2006); see also Donehue, supra note 83, at
214 (explaining that before a defendant can waive his right to counsel, the court must establish that
“he knows what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes open” (quoting Faretta v. California,
422 U.S. 806, 835 (1975)) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Sogabe, supra note 83, at 139-40
(noting that Supreme Court precedent requires any waiver of counsel be made knowingly and
intelligently).
147 Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 401 n.12 (1993); see also Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S.
164, 177-78 (2008) (permitting separate standards for competency to stand trial and competency to
proceed pro se); Felthous, supra note 84, at 108 (distinguishing competency generally from the
competency necessary to enter a guilty plea or waive the right to counsel).
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unrepresented, the issue of his competence has not been properly resolved.
Any agreement flowing from this failure to adjudicate competence should
be evaluated in the same way as it would be under the contractual framework. This would mean that a defendant’s continuing waiver of counsel
would have to satisfy the elements of a valid contract for the pro se contract
to be enforceable. But a pro se contract cannot be valid if, at any time
during the criminal proceeding, the defendant’s competence is called into
question. If a criminal defendant is deprived of counsel at this “critical
stage,” the “pro se contract” should be voidable at the discretion of the
defendant. But why void the trial?
Professor Eisenberg’s reasoning, explaining why contracts with incompetent parties are inappropriate, applies with even more force to the pro se
contract. First, a court allowing a defendant whose competence is in doubt
to waive counsel “violates conventional moral standards” deeply rooted in
our society.148 Unlike a contract without mutual assent, a defendant’s
competency stage deprivation runs afoul of the Constitution.149 Second,
allowing a determination of one’s competence to be made without counsel is
inefficient. Like voidable contracts, “[t]he maxim that a promisor is the best
judge of his own utility can have little application.”150 Indeed, the purpose
of the competency hearing itself is to determine whether that maxim
applies. Recognizing a waiver before the requisite competence is established, therefore, puts the cart before the horse.
The inefficiency flowing from defendants proceeding unrepresented at
competency hearings comes in several forms. One form is theoretical:
illegitimate waivers remove defense counsel from trials where they rightfully
belong. The Sixth Amendment right-to-counsel was established to minimize
the imbalance of power between the accused and the government within our
adversarial system.151 The right recognizes that the American criminal
justice system is complex and is meant to protect the layman who may be
unable to effectively navigate his defense alone.152 Therefore, each time a
148
149

Eisenberg, supra note 144, at 765.
See U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.”).
150 Eisenberg, supra note 144, at 765.
151 See United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 227 (1967) (“The presence of counsel . . . operates to assure that the accused’s interests will be protected consistently with our
adversary theory of criminal prosecution.”); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68-69 (1932) (“The
right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did not comprehend the right to be
heard by counsel.”).
152 See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 345 (1963) (“Even the intelligent and educated
layman has small and sometimes no skill in the science of law.” (quoting Powell, 287 U.S. at 69));
see also Maness v. Meyers, 419 U.S. 449, 466 (1975) (“[A layman] often depends upon legal advice
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defendant is unrepresented during his competency hearing, the trial that
follows is theoretically less efficient.
A second form of inefficiency is any post-trial appeals that flow from
violations of the pro se contract. The very subject of this Comment—the
proper remedy after a competency stage deprivation—is relevant only when
a post-trial appeal is being decided. Regardless of the remedy that a court
ultimately chooses, the draining of judicial resources and credibility is a
necessary consequence of this trial-level error. Instead of the theoretical,
market-based inefficiency of voidable contracts, however, the violation of
the pro se contract introduces immediate and tangible inefficiency into the
federal system. Therefore, a trial judge’s violation of the pro se contract
taints the agreement at least as much as—and arguably even more than—the
making of a contract for goods or services with an incompetent party.
Because the two violations mirror each other in important ways, the established remedy for contractual incapacity should inform the analysis of
competency stage deprivations.
The majority contract rule is that “an incompetent person’s transactions
are voidable.”153 If one accepts the analogy between traditional contracts and
the pro se contract, the next question is: how does this rule translate into an
appellate remedy following a deprivation of counsel? This question helps
clarify the distinctions between automatic reversals (Ross) and evidentiary
hearings (Klat), and it leads to the conclusion that the former is the more
appropriate remedy for pro se contract violations.
Automatic reversal closely resembles the voiding of a traditional
contract. If a contract with an incompetent party is voidable at the incompetent party’s discretion, automatic reversals would provide aggrieved
defendants with a functionally equivalent remedy. A judicial error that does
not negatively affect the trial (in the defendant’s view),154 like a mutually
beneficial contract, could stand. If the defendant was not satisfied with the
outcome of his trial, however, an appeal would function as a request to void
the result. An appellate court would simply evaluate whether any required
element of a valid waiver, like a required element of an enforceable contract,
was absent during trial. If the reviewing court finds a missing element, then
the waiver and conviction would not stand.

from someone who is trained and skilled in the subject matter . . . .”); Howe, supra note 10, at 134
(“The primary purpose of th[e] guarantee [of counsel] is to help the layman when confronted with
the inherent complexity of the American system of criminal law.”).
153 WILLISTON & LORD, supra note 142, § 10:3.
154 The judicial error in this case would be allowing a defendant to proceed unrepresented at
his competency hearing.
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Automatic reversals are also consistent with the contract incapacity timing
rule, which states that a contracting party’s capacity at the time of the
execution of the contract determines his ability to make the agreement in
question.155 Therefore, where a trial court determines a defendant’s competence to proceed pro se during a hearing where the defendant is unrepresented, the window of time during which competence must be confirmed is
irretrievably lost. Automatic reversals recognize the importance of this lost
opportunity. Instead of attempting to recreate that moment in time, the
automatic-reversal remedy acknowledges the “fluid state of mental illness”156
and the “inherent unreliability and inadequacy of all retrospective hearings.”157
This recognition would lead a court following the Ross approach to ask the
right question: was there a valid agreement to proceed pro se or was a
required element of the agreement absent? Without a constitutionally-valid
waiver, a defendant would not be able to represent himself under this
approach.
By contrast, an evidentiary hearing to determine whether or not a
competency stage deprivation was harmless has a completely different
focus—one that is arguably misguided. Evidentiary hearings do not ask
whether a waiver of counsel was valid. Instead, they ask whether any
potential invalidity in the waiver procedure made a difference at trial. This
question essentially works like a contract rule stating that a contract with an
incompetent party is voidable by that party only if (1) the court finds that
the contract was a bad deal, and (2) absent the party’s incompetence, the
result of the deal would be different. Put another way, finding that a competency stage deprivation of counsel was “harmless error” after an evidentiary
hearing shows that the court nonetheless substantially performed its
constitutional duties.
However, it makes little sense to speak in terms of “substantial performance” of Sixth Amendment protections. Unlike a construction contract
155 17A C.J.S. Contracts § 141 (1999) (“The mental incapacity, or unsoundness of mind, that
affects the validity of a contract must be of the time at which the transaction occurs, regardless of
previous or subsequent insanity.”).
156 Hannah Robertson Miller, Note, “A Meaningless Ritual”: How the Lack of a Postconviction
Competency Standard Deprives the Mentally Ill of Effective Habeas Review in Texas, 87 TEX. L. REV.
267, 296 (2008); see also Michael L. Radelet & Kent S. Miller, The Aftermath of Ford v. Wainwright, 10 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 339, 349-50 (1992) (describing the issues that surround cases in
which death row inmates vacillate between competency and incompetency).
157 David W. Beaudreau, Comment, Due Process or “Some Process”? Restoring Pate v. Robinson’s
Guarantee of Adequate Competency Procedures, 47 CAL. W. L. REV. 369, 404 (2011); see also United
States v. Day, 949 F.2d 973, 982 n.9 (8th Cir. 1991) (“To require a sentencing court to decide
whether a defendant was competent during proceedings that took place years earlier would be an
exercise in futility.”).
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that may be “substantially performed” despite a less-than-perfect execution,158 a criminal trial where a defendant invalidly proceeds pro se cannot
produce a “nearly constitutional” trial. A “nearly constitutional” trial is
unconstitutional, and a competency stage deprivation poisons the entirety
of the proceedings.159 Yet, the focus of evidentiary hearings in this context,
however improper, is to differentiate between levels of unconstitutionality.
Attempting to retrospectively assess a defendant’s competence is also
inconsistent with the contract incapacity timing rule for a more practical
reason. Because a defendant’s competence at “the time of the execution”160
of the pro se contract is never validly determined in these circumstances,
retrospective hearings attempt to recreate “the defendant’s condition at the
time of the original state proceedings.”161 However, when a defendant “is
denied his statutory right to counsel during a hearing, it is nearly impossible
for an appellate court to determine whether this error was harmless.”162
Competency stage deprivations are especially difficult to analyze. Harmlessness must be decided “on the basis of a record developed at an evidentiary hearing conducted in the absence of that counsel,” while “only
speculat[ion] on what the record might have been had counsel been provided”
is possible.163 The continued use of evidentiary hearings instead of automatic reversals, therefore, puts Sixth Amendment jurisprudence on an unstable
foundation. The right to counsel cannot be partially performed, and every
evidentiary hearing that finds “harmless error” undermines the credibility
of the judiciary.

158 See 15 WILLISTON & LORD, supra note 142, § 44:52 (4th ed. 2000) (“Pursuant to the
doctrine of ‘substantial performance,’ a technical breach of the terms of a contract is excused . . . because actual performance is so similar to the required performance that any breach
that may have been committed is immaterial.”).
159 As the Supreme Court explained in Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 309-10 (1991),
automatic reversal is appropriate where the court makes a structural error. Structural errors “defy
analysis by ‘harmless error’ standards . . . [because they affect] the framework within which the
trial proceeds, rather than simply an error in the trial process itself.” Id. The Court already
recognizes that a complete denial of counsel during a criminal trial is structural error. See United
States v. Lewis, 21 F. App’x 843, 846 (10th Cir. 2001) (“Among the rights deemed ‘structural’ by the
Supreme Court is the complete denial of counsel during a criminal trial.” (citing Gideon v.
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963))).
160 17A C.J.S. Contracts § 141 (1999).
161 See Reynolds v. Norris, 86 F.3d 796, 802 (8th Cir. 1996).
162 Lewis, 21 F. App’x at 846.
163 United States v. Vasquez, 7 F.3d 81, 85 (5th Cir. 1993); see also Green v. United States, 262
F.3d 715, 718 (8th Cir. 2001) (explaining that the government cannot retrospectively demonstrate
harmless error “by relying upon testimony from the very hearing at which [a defendant] was
unrepresented”).
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B. Pragmatism: The Practical Futility of Evidentiary Hearings
The second reason to automatically reverse after a competency stage
deprivation is simple—it will work well in practice. A theory’s value is often
a function of its ease of application. A rule or standard that judges fail to
correctly understand or interpret provides little utility. As Girvan and
Deason explain,
[t]he ability to operationalize the social theory embodied in the law is highly
relevant to the development of sound, predictable, and reliable legal standards. . . . To the extent that [a] hypothesis is poorly operationalized
such that it is not easily or obviously testable against the sort of evidence
that is likely to be available . . . [case] outcomes . . . will be unnecessarily error prone at best and unpredictably random at worst.164

The Ross automatic-reversal rule is more practical than the Klat evidentiary
hearing standard. This conclusion is based primarily on an application of
the well-known rules versus standards debate to the specific contours of
competency stage deprivations.165
Rules and standards are two “different forms that a directive can take.”166
For example, a rule might state that “no driver shall travel above sixty-five
miles-per-hour in a vehicle” or, more relevant here, “a defendant deprived
of counsel during a hearing to determine his competence shall have his
conviction and sentence reversed.” These directives, instead framed as
standards, might state that “any driver traveling at an excessive speed will be
subject to an appropriate fine” or “a defendant who is deprived of counsel
during a hearing to determine his competence may have his conviction
reversed only if the absence of counsel affected the result.” Of course, rules
and standards each have benefits and limitations. In his pioneering work on
the rules versus standards debate, Duncan Kennedy attempted to catalog
these considerations by creating the following table:
164 Erik J. Girvan & Grace Deason, Social Science in Law: A Psychological Case for Abandoning
the “Discriminatory Motive” Under Title VII, 60 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 1057, 1066-67 (2013).
165 See generally Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557
(1992) (applying economic analysis to compare rulemaking versus standard setting at the agency
and individual levels); Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89
HARV. L. REV. 1685 (1976) (examining the rules versus standards debate within the context of
altruism versus individual-focused selfishness models); Russell B. Korobkin, Behavioral Analysis
and Legal Form: Rules vs. Standards Revisited, 79 OR. L. REV. 23 (2000) (viewing the rules versus
standards debate through a behavioral science lens); Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with Rules, 83
CALIF. L. REV. 953 (1995) (comparing an approach to legal judgment based on abstract principles
to one based on case-by-case decisionmaking).
166 Pierre Schlag, Formalism and Realism in Ruins (Mapping the Logics of Collapse), 95 IOWA L.
REV. 195, 225 (2009).

2014]

309

Pro Se Paternalism
Table 1: Rules vs. Standards167

Benefits of
Rules

Criticisms of Rules

Benefits of
Standards

Criticisms of
Standards

Provide for easy
application

Provide only a
crude application

Allow for a
complex,
textured
analysis

Lead to unpredictable
results

Seemingly
comprehensive

New developments
fall outside

Can be applied
to new
developments

Not fully articulated
or concrete

Less judicial
activism
possible

Box judges in

Vest trust in
judges

Open to judicial
abuses

Immediate
answers

Answers that fail to
do justice

“Right answer”
possible

Hard to operationalize

Admittedly, a cursory examination of the above table can make the topic
of this Comment seem like an exercise in futility. If both the rule-based,
automatic reversal approach and the standard-based, evidentiary hearing
approach have competing benefits and limitations, the choice of one over
the other might seem like a matter of preference. Application of these two
approaches within the context of competency stage deprivations, however,
reveals that they do not capture the benefits of their competing forms
equally. Ross’s automatic reversal approach is able to capitalize on the
advantages of rules while minimizing the impact of many of their inherent
limitations. By contrast, the ability of Klat evidentiary hearings to produce
the general benefits of standards is doubtful, and the limitations of the form
are quite concerning within this context.
A competency stage deprivation of counsel prevents a proper, ex ante
determination of a defendant’s competence. Ross automatic reversals do not
try to make such a determination ex post, opting instead to provide a
bright-line rule once a competency stage deprivation is found. This remedy
captures some of the most important benefits of rules: reversals are easy to
167 This table builds on and slightly modifies the original version provided in Kennedy, supra
note 165, at 1710, which was cited and slightly modified in Schlag, supra note 166, at 226.
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apply, provide uniform and predictable results, and rein in the power of the
judge whose error prompted appellate review in the first instance. With
regard to the potential disadvantages of rules, Ross automatic reversals
cannot be said to be authoritarian or draconian. The remedy instead
provides defendants relief from the coercive power of the State in cases
where their constitutional rights were violated. Automatic reversal in the
competency context is also unambiguous. Unlike the earlier example rule
stating that “no driver shall travel more than 65 miles-per-hour in a vehicle,”
which leaves a court to decide whether motorcycles or skateboards qualify as
vehicles,168 competency stage deprivations are much clearer. Cronic and its
progeny169 established the boundaries and continue to provide useful
guideposts for courts to use in assessing constructive denial of counsel
claims. Unlike the hypothetical speed-limit rule above, a rule focused on
competency stage deprivations does not suffer from threshold definitional
issues like the meaning of “vehicle.” This is not to say that none of the
limitations of rules apply to post-deprivation automatic reversals, but those
limitations that do apply are outweighed by competing benefits.
By contrast, the circumstances giving rise to a competency stage deprivation make Klat’s standards-based approach less attractive when applied.
Two of the most important benefits of standards are: (1) their empowerment
of judges to make individualized decisions; and (2) their ability to arrive at
(or at least attempt to arrive at) an objectively correct answer in every case.
However, the flexibility which is usually a significant advantage of a standards-based approach seems problematic within the context of retrospective
competency hearings. First, the same judge who erred by permitting the
defendant to represent himself at his original competency hearing would
likely preside over the retrospective hearing. If the same judge is tasked
again with making a determination of a defendant’s rights, there is little
justification for granting the judge broad discretion the second time around.
Next, as discussed within the context of the “pro se contract,” coming to an
objectively correct answer, even after a retrospective hearing, may be
“nearly impossible.”170 This is because the harmlessness of a prior deprivation of counsel must be decided on the “basis of a record developed . . . in

168 See, e.g., H. L. A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV .
593, 607 (1958) (noting the uncertainty surrounding the meaning of words such as “vehicle” at the
margins).
169 See supra Section I.B.
170 See United States v. Lewis, 21 F. App’x 843, 846 (10th Cir. 2001) (discussing the difficulties of retrospective hearings); see also supra Section IV.A.
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the absence of that counsel.”171 At a minimum, any retrospective hearing
would suffer from “the inherent unreliability and inadequacy of all retrospective hearings.”172 At worst, arriving at the “correct” result through
holding a retrospective hearing may be “impossible.”173
Additionally, the deficiencies of Klat retrospective hearings magnify the
limitations characteristic of all standards-based approaches. Examining
individual competency stage deprivations according to a vague standard
yields results that are unpredictable, variable, and influenced by outside
factors. Most importantly, however, remedying a Sixth Amendment
violation with a procedurally inadequate retrospective hearing “completely
vitiates the rights guaranteed . . . because such a remedy affirms the conviction without ever holding a procedurally adequate competency hearing.”174
By its very text, the Sixth Amendment applies to “all criminal prosecutions.”175 But when courts make procedural exceptions to uphold the results
of certain trials which did not meet the requirements of the Sixth
Amendment, they lower the nation’s collective standards of justice. To avoid
the further development of this incompetent jurisprudence, competency
stage deprivations should be remedied through an automatic reversal rule.
C. Deterring Volitional Behavior: Maximizing Compliance
Through Prospect Theory
A final justification for automatically reversing after a competency stage
deprivation is based on deterrence. Automatic reversals have the potential
to deter judicial malfeasance and misfeasance more effectively than evidentiary hearings.176 That is, a future defendant’s constitutional right to counsel
is less likely to be violated if automatic reversal is the remedy available for
violations. Behavioral psychology, rooted in the insights of prospect theory,177
explains why this is the case. Depriving a defendant of counsel at his
competency hearing is constitutional error in every circuit that has decided

171 See United States v. Vasquez, 7 F.3d 81, 85 (5th Cir. 1993); see also Green v. United States,
262 F.3d 715, 718 (8th Cir. 2001) (explaining that the government cannot retrospectively
demonstrate harmless error “by relying upon testimony from the very hearing at which [a
defendant] was unrepresented”).
172 Beaudreau, supra note 157, at 404.
173 See Evans v. Raines, 800 F.2d 884, 888 (9th Cir. 1986) (“When the state court fails [to
hold a required competency hearing], it often may be impossible to repair the damage retrospectively.”).
174 Beaudreau, supra note 157, at 406.
175 See U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
176 See infra subsection IV.C.1.
177 See infra notes 187-96.
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the issue.178 While the circuits are split over whether a Klat evidentiary
hearing or a Ross automatic reversal is proper, a competency stage deprivation is error under either approach. Appellate courts reviewing a case in
which a defendant waived counsel before his competency hearing, therefore,
all levy a punishment of sorts against trial courts—and trial court judges—
in the form of a remand. This punishment is the focus of deterrence theory.
The purpose of punishment, generally, is to “announc[e] certain standards of behavior and attach[] penalties for deviation.”179 Just as lawmakers
try to design criminal punishment systems that will deter undesirable
behavior, appellate courts seek to optimize their control over district court
abuses by “devising a penalty-setting system that assigns . . . punishments
of a magnitude sufficient to deter a thinking [court] from committing” the
same error.180 Put in economic terms, an appellate court shapes remedies so
that the expected utility of future compliance for district court judges
exceeds the expected benefits of noncompliance.181 With these incentives in
mind, appellate courts can shape remedies to influence district court
analyses and promote more accurate judicial decisionmaking.
At its most basic level, a rational actor–deterrence model recognizes that
individuals “respond to the incentives that they face, particularly the
penalties which are imposed by the legal system.”182 Forced to preside over
the “minefield”183 that pro se litigation creates, a trial court judge is incentivized to avoid a penalty in the form of a remand of his judgment or
sentencing decision. The full set of considerations faced by judges can be
quantified by multiplying the likelihood of remand by the severity of the

178
179

See supra Part II.
Johannes Andenaes, The General Preventative Effects of Punishment, 114 U. PA. L. REV.
949, 982 (1966) (quoting H. L. A. HART, PROLEGOMENON TO THE PRINCIPLES OF
PUNISHMENT 21-22 (1960)).
180 Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Role of Deterrence in the Formulation of Criminal
Law Rules: At Its Worst When Doing Its Best, 91 GEO. L.J. 949, 950 (2003).
181 See Alexandra White Dunahoe, Revisiting the Cost-Benefit Calculus of the Misbehaving Prosecutor: Deterrence Economics and Transitory Prosecutors, 61 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 45, 55 (2005)
(providing a “law and economics” analysis in the context of deterrence of prosecutorial misconduct).
182 Id.
183 See Michele N. Struffolino, Taking Limited Representation to the Limits: The Efficacy of Using
Unbundled Legal Services in Domestic-Relations Matters Involving Litigation, 2 ST. MARY’S J. ON
LEGAL MALPRACTICE & ETHICS 166, 211 (2012) (arguing the rules imposed in court
proceedings are a “minefield” for the pro se litigant); see also Drew A. Swank, Note, The Pro Se
Phenomenon, 19 BYU J. PUB. L. 373, 384 (2005) (claiming that pro se litigation results in
inefficiency).
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specific remedy mandated by the appellate court.184 More precisely, the
simplified judicial incentive formula can be written as: LR x SP = EP, where
LR is the likelihood of remand, SP is the severity of penalty, and EP is the
total expected punishment.185 Assigning numeric values to the Ross and Klat
remedies helps to demonstrate this point more concretely and illustrate
their different deterrent potentials.
First, for both approaches, the likelihood of remand remains constant.
This is because appellate decisions to remand are not a function of the
specific remedy attached. LR = 1 in both equations, therefore, because the
remedy comes after an initial decision to remand. Second, automatic
reversal is a more severe penalty than an evidentiary hearing carrying only
the possibility of reversal. This difference is reflected in the equation by
making SP = (-10) for automatic reversal, while SP = (-10) (0.5) + (0)(0.5) =
(-5) for an evidentiary hearing with possible reversal. For purposes of
simplicity, the chances of reversal after the model evidentiary hearing are
set at 50 percent.186 Plugging both remedies into the formula yields the
following:
Ross automatic reversal: 1 x (-10) = -10
Klat evidentiary hearing: 1 x [(-10)(0.5) + (0)(0.5)] = -5

The equations reveal that a judge can expect a penalty of -10 where
automatic reversal is the remedy for a competency stage deprivation. By
contrast, a judge sitting in a circuit where an evidentiary hearing is the
remedy used faces a penalty with a total expected payoff of -5.
A harsher penalty, however, does not necessarily equate to a more effective
penalty, and abstract quantification of different punishments says nothing
about real-world effects. After all, for a difference in remedy to have any
measurable deterrent impact, an implicit assumption is that a difference in
remedy will influence judicial decisionmaking. While this may seem like an
184 See John W. Heiderscheit III, Rule 37 Discovery Sanctions in the Ninth Circuit: The Collapse
of the Deterrence Goal, 68 OR. L. REV. 57, 66-67 (1989) (explaining how Rule 37 sanctions deter
bad behavior at trial depending on how the litigants perceive the likelihood and severity of
potential punishments). The phrase “full set of considerations” here does not, nor should it,
account for the political, personal, or other outside considerations of judges. If these considerations do consciously play a role in a particular judge’s decisionmaking, such a variable would be
difficult to model and even more difficult to justify.
185 Id. at 67 n.52 (describing the considerations for a litigant facing possible sanctions as LP x
SP = EP, where LP is the likelihood of punishment).
186 In practice, this figure will vary depending on a host of factors including the particular
appellate court, the reviewing judge, and case-specific facts. Regardless of the actual likelihood of a
reversal in each case, the point remains that evidentiary hearings introduce uncertainty that makes
appellate review less effective at serving deterrent goals.
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unrealistic assumption to some, Kahneman and Tverksy’s prospect theory
would predict systematic deviation in judicial decisionmaking as a function
of the remedies available for error.187 Some may argue that judges are
different and their cognitive psychology should not be analyzed using the
same behavioral models derived from lay intuitions. If judges are individuals
like the rest of us, however, then prospect theory has explanatory power.
Prospect theory describes human decisionmaking under risk. The
fundamental insight of the theory is that “individuals tend to value losses
more heavily than gains of the same magnitude.”188 For example:
[I]f a person is given a choice between a 70% shot at $100 or a certain award
of $70 [a gain], he will normally choose the certain $70. On the other hand,
if forced to choose between paying a $70 fee or taking a 70% chance of having
to pay a $100 fee [a loss], he will normally choose to gamble and face the
70% chance of paying the $100 fee.189

The above study, and countless others like it, conclude that individuals are
risk-seeking for losses but risk-averse for gains.190 Naturally, a host of
implications flow from this insight, one of which is particularly helpful to
the current discussion of a remedy’s deterrent power: the certainty effect.
Through an analysis of the certainty effect, Ross automatic reversals are
shown to be more effective at deterring judges from presiding over competency stage deprivations. From a behavioral perspective, therefore, automatic
reversals are preferable to evidentiary hearings if a greater number of future
defendants are to receive their constitutionally guaranteed right to counsel.
1. The Certainty Effect
Automatic reversals would deter judges more effectively because their
punitive effect is unambiguous. Evidentiary hearings, by contrast, introduce
uncertainty and threaten only a probabilistic punishment. Prospect theory’s
certainty effect can help explain this difference. The certainty effect is
derivable directly from prospect theory’s fundamental premise. Because
187 See generally Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision
Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263 (1979) (articulating prospect theory and its implications for
the first time).
188 Chris Guthrie, Prospect Theory, Risk Preference, and the Law, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 1115, 1119
(2003); see also Kahneman & Tversky, supra note 187, at 279 (“The aggravation that one experiences
in losing a sum of money appears to be greater than the pleasure associated with gaining the same
amount.”).
189 Note, Risk-Preference Asymmetries in Class Action Litigation, 119 HARV. L. REV. 587, 589
n.11 (2005).
190 Id. at 589.
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losses loom larger than gains, “responses to uncertain situations appear to
have an all or none characteristic that is sensitive to the possibility rather
than the probability of strong positive or negative consequences, causing
very small probabilities to carry great weight.”191 Put differently, when
individuals are forced to make decisions under the risk of deciding incorrectly, they systematically “overweigh[] outcomes that are considered
certain, relative to outcomes which are merely probable.”192 The certainty
effect is most powerful when an individual’s decision is accompanied by
“anticipatory emotions” such as fear, anxiety, and dread.193
Applying prospect theory and its certainty effect reveals why the Ross
approach deters constitutional violations better than the Klat approach. The
difference is rooted in the uncertainty created by evidentiary hearings
carrying only a chance of reversal, which contrasts starkly with the certainty
provided by automatic reversal. Although an automatic reversal and an
evidentiary hearing can yield the same penalty (reversal), the latter
introduces variability into the deterrence calculus. A trial court judge,
presiding over a competency hearing for a criminal defendant otherwise
proceeding pro se, is more likely to ensure that the defendant’s competence
is subject to meaningful adversarial testing when the threat of an automatic
reversal is available to the reviewing judge.
The certainty effect may cause a judge who is “pretty sure” of precedent
governing self-representation at competency hearings to invest more time
and effort into knowing the law if automatic reversal is available.194 For
example, in a cognitive study, lawyers were more willing to pay for discovery
information that would increase their chances of winning from 95% to 100%
than they were for information increasing their chances of winning from
25% to 30%.195 Normatively, individuals should be willing to pay the same
amount for the discovery information in both cases because the difference
made by the information is 5% in each case. Descriptively, however,

191 Paul Slovic et al., Risk as Analysis and Risk as Feelings: Some Thoughts About Affect, Reason,
Risk, and Rationality, 24 RISK ANALYSIS 311, 318 (2004) (emphasis removed).
192 Kevin Jon Heller, The Cognitive Psychology of Circumstantial Evidence, 105 M ICH. L. REV.
241, 283 (2006).
193 See George F. Loewenstein et al., Risk as Feelings, 127 PSYCHOL. BULL. 267, 267-68
(2001).
194 See Richard Birke, Commentary, Settlement Psychology: When Decision-Making Processes
Fail, 18 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG. 203, 215 (2000) (applying the certainty effect to
the behavior of lawyers in the discovery process).
195 Id.
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individuals are systematically willing to pay a premium to avoid uncertainty.196 But how does this reasoning apply to the current question of remedy?
The argument goes as follows: if an automatic reversal (a certain penalty)
awaits a trial judge unless he ensures that a defendant is represented at his
competency hearing, the certainty effect predicts that he will be much more
likely to take steps to avoid error. By contrast, if an evidentiary hearing
were the sole remedy available for error, the certainty effect predicts that a
judge may be less likely to invest the time and research necessary to
understand the nuances of the law and ensure that even stand-by counsel
provides a meaningful adversarial testing. Just like individuals in cognitive
studies, busy trial judges are presumably risk-seeking when faced with the
prospect of a loss in the form of a remand. The threat of a loss, therefore,
should incentivize judges to take the steps necessary to reduce their exposure to remand. The uncertainty introduced by evidentiary hearings makes
the remedy less of a cognizable loss, however, and therefore the remedy is
less effective at deterring judicial missteps. This result should remain
observable even where a judge faces either automatic reversal (100% chance
of loss) or an evidentiary hearing with a resulting 99% chance of reversal.197
Indeed, the power of the certainty effect is that even this seemingly
miniscule difference in probability can lead to systematic behavioral deviation. As a result, the risk premium paid by judges—time and effort, for
purposes of this analysis—is more likely to be invested where a certain
penalty hangs in the balance. Automatic reversal provides this certainty, and
deterrence of judicial error is more likely to follow from the Ross approach.
2. Criticisms of Deterrence-Based Reasoning in this Context
Certain questions can be raised regarding the efficacy of deterrencebased strategies where judges are the intended audience. First, if an appellate remand is to deter subsequent violations by trial court judges, three
prerequisites must be satisfied: the judge must know the new standard, he
must perceive the cost of violation to be greater than the perceived benefit
of misfeasance or malfeasance, “and he must be able and willing to bring

196 See, e.g., Kahneman & Tversky, supra note 187, at 265 (noting that “people overweight
outcomes that are considered certain”); see also Clifford W. Smith, Jr., Market Volatility: Causes and
Consequences, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 953, 956 (1989) (explaining that investors require increasing
“risk premiums” to invest in volatile opportunities); Note, supra note 189, at 592 (“A risk-seeking
plaintiff[’s] . . . greater willingness to go to trial means that the defendant must pay him a risk
premium above the expected value . . . to induce him to settle.”).
197 The probability of reversal of the hearing could be this high, hypothetically, for a variety
of case-specific reasons.
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such knowledge to bear on his conduct decision at the time of the
offense.”198 The absence of even one of these preconditions undermines
deterrent goals within the criminal law context.199 Application of these
preconditions to the context of appellate review, however, reveals that
judges, perhaps even more than lawyers or other sophisticated parties, are
good targets for deterrence-based strategies. Expecting a judge to
understand new precedent, to rationally calculate, and to conform his
decisions accordingly does not seem unrealistic. In this regard, automatic
reversal, as opposed to an evidentiary hearing, is the penalty more likely to
deter a rationally calculating judge from allowing a defendant to proceed
unrepresented during his competency hearing. Although automatically
reversing a defendant’s conviction and sentence based on this judicial error
is more severe, the result is also more likely to motivate other judges to
become aware of the standard and adjust their behavior accordingly—a
general deterrent effect.
Second, when taken in isolation, the above deterrence analysis is far too
simplistic. One could argue that solely comparing the deterrent potential of
various remedies simply leads to choosing the penalty that is the harshest in
every case. In a system concerned only with deterrence, therefore, serious
punishment could be appropriate for a judge allowing a defendant to
proceed unrepresented during his competency hearing. This result should
seem ridiculous to most readers, however, and for good reason. Analyzing a
remedy through a one-dimensional deterrence analysis ignores considerations of morality and proportionality that are important to most individuals.200 While choosing a harsh penalty like jail time might better prevent
judicial error in more cases, effective deterrence might come at the cost of
the justice system’s credibility and legitimacy.201

198 Cf. Robinson & Darley, supra note 180, at 953 (discussing the prerequisites that must be
satisfied for criminal law to effectively deter potential violators).
199 Id. at 953-56 (discussing how deterrence is undermined by violator’s lack of knowledge of
the law, inaccurate perception of the cost of violating rules, and inability to make rational
decisions).
200 See, e.g., Paul H. Robinson, Competing Conceptions of Modern Desert: Vengeful, Deontological,
and Empirical, 67 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 145, 149 (2008) (explaining that social science experiments
reveal that concepts of blameworthiness and justice strongly influence community intuitions about
desert); Paul H. Robinson, Commentary, Punishing Dangerousness: Cloaking Preventive Detention as
Criminal Justice, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1429, 1434-39, 1444-46, 1450-54 (2001) (exploring issues of
proportionality and justice in a criminal law system that increasingly emphasizes preventive
detention).
201 PAUL H. ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAW: CASE STUDIES AND CONTROVERSIES 98 (3d ed.
2012) (“Thus, the criminal law’s moral credibility is essential to effective crime control, and is
enhanced if the distribution of criminal liability is perceived as ‘doing justice’ . . . .”).
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Again, however, this general critique of deterrence seems to be less
applicable to the current analysis of remedies. First, as the Ross court stated,
the “established rule [is] that complete deprivation of counsel during a
critical stage warrants automatic reversal without consideration of
prejudice.”202 With the Supreme Court developing critical stage doctrine
and reaffirming its requirements over decades of jurisprudence, the argument that automatic reversal is unnecessarily draconian or unprecedented is
not credible. First, granting an automatic reversal in such cases falls well
within the established lines of proportionality and legitimacy established by
this nation’s highest court. Second, both the Ross and Klat approaches
feature reversal as at least one of the remedies available when a defendant is
unrepresented at his competency hearing. Both approaches, therefore,
implicitly acknowledge that reversal is an appropriate remedy under at least
some circumstances. The argument in favor of one or the other simply
revolves around whether reversal should be automatic or come after an
evidentiary hearing—a debate that belongs more within the rules versus
standards paradigm, not a desert paradigm.203 Automatic reversal is the
established remedy for a deprivation of counsel at a “critical stage,” so
characterizing reversal as unnecessarily harsh to accomplish judicial deterrence in the competency hearing context is indefensible. Absent a global
critique calling for the complete end to reversals, both Klat and Ross seem
legitimate from a proportionality perspective.
Finally, the most damning critique of deterrence-based justifications for
automatic reversal questions whether individual judges, operating within a
larger federal court system, can even be deterred at all. This critique, rooted
in what I will refer to as “organizational theory,” attacks the fundamental
premise that individuals can be effectively deterred under the right conditions. Organizational theory
criticizes rational choice theory for ignoring the impact organizations play
in influencing individual actions. According to this account, the structure
and culture of an institution frame . . . the situation for its agents, such
that they are no longer acting as isolated rational individuals, engaging in a
rational actor calculus. Instead, they function as part of a larger structure,
absorbed in a larger cause, with the result that the organization’s rationality—
its goals and means—dominates in a way that may escape the attention of any
one individual. This process can then create a recipe for organizational

202
203

United States v. Ross, 703 F.3d 856, 874 (6th Cir. 2012).
For more on the competing benefits and limitations of rules and standards, see generally
Korobkin, supra note 165, and Kaplow, supra note 165.
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wrongdoing that will never trouble the conscience of anyone within the
organization.204

If organizational norms and standards truly shape the decisions of individual
judges in the same way that they allegedly limit the discretion of police
officers,205 for example, then a deterrence-based theory focused on individual
judges is misguided. Instead, under organizational theory, cultural and
“structural change” of the court system as a whole is required before any
individual judge can be deterred.206
Organizational theory, however, is not nearly as accepted as the competing
theory of “methodological individualism.”207 Methodological individualism
holds that “[i]nstitutions composed of individuals will only behave rationally,
that is, will only adopt optimal means of achieving their goals, if such
behavior results from the separate, self-interested behaviors of the people
who comprise them.”208 This view of organizations as being reducible to the
level of the individual is “even more foundational to law and economics than
the rationality assumption, serving as a kind of framing constraint, rather
than simply an assumption.”209 While neither theory can be definitively
proven, methodological individualism’s appeal stems from a number of
epistemological advantages over organizational theory. First, methodological
individualism is more consistent with one’s everyday experience, allowing for
a more intuitive explanation and avoiding metaphorical statements.210
Second, unlike organizational theory, methodological individualism “generates testable hypotheses” regarding individual behavior and preferences.211
For example, identifying a particular judge as “conservative” is testable,
while classifying an entire court as “conservative” is a more complex task
204 Kit Kinports, Culpability, Deterrence, and the Exclusionary Rule, 21 WM. & MARY BILL
RTS. J. 821, 832-34 (2013) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
205 See id.; see also Barbara E. Armacost, Organizational Culture and Police Misconduct, 72 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 453, 512-13 (2004) (claiming that informal police force norms create organizational
control over the range of discretion of individual officers).
206 See Kinports, supra note 204, at 834 (arguing that, in the context of police behavior, the
exclusionary rule could only serve as a deterrent if it spoke to police culture and created structural
change); see also Armacost, supra note 205, at 509-10, 528 (opining that “systemic” remedies are
needed to deter police misconduct, rather than “individual-specific” solutions).
207 See Robert C. Ellickson, Law and Economics Discovers Social Norms, 27 J. LEGAL S TUD.
537, 539 (1998) (defining methodological individualism as “the assumption that individuals are the
only agents of human action”); Jason Scott Johnston, Law, Economics, and Post-Realist Explanation,
24 LAW & SOC’ Y REV. 1217, 1244 (1990) (“Even the most superficially functional economic
analysts of law ultimately adopt a methodological individualist research program . . . .”).
208 Edward Rubin, Commentary, Rational States?, 83 VA. L. REV. 1433, 1436 (1997).
209 Robert Ahdieh, Beyond Individualism in Law and Economics, 91 B.U. L. REV. 43, 45 (2011).
210 See Rubin, supra note 208, at 1436.
211 Id.

320

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 163: 283

which requires an analysis of the preferences of individual judges anyway—
just less directly. Finally, methodological individualism focuses its analysis
on the point where the “human experience occurs,” instead of requiring an
abstraction to a higher order.212 Therefore, while one might question the
ability of appellate review to deter judges from violating the constitutional
rights of future defendants, that criticism should not lead to a recommendation that entire courts should be deterred instead. Individual judges make
decisions, and therefore individual judges have the power to ensure that a
defendant is not deprived of counsel at his competency hearing. Automatically reversing a conviction and sentence—entered after a defendant’s Sixth
Amendment rights were violated—is the most effective and efficient means
to prevent future constitutional violations ex ante. If one remedy, consistent
with Supreme Court jurisprudence, has the ability to reduce constitutional
violations, there is little reason to select a competing theory. In order to do
justice efficiently, automatic reversal should be the uniform remedy in this
context.
V. CRITIQUING REVERSALS: EMPIRICAL DESERT
AND CHILLING EFFECTS
The preceding Part provided three separate, but related, justifications
for automatic reversal after a competency stage deprivation. Whether
contractual, practical, or behavioral reasoning is ultimately persuasive,
automatic reversals are a superior remedy to evidentiary hearings. As the
above discussion made clear, however, each justification is vulnerable to its
own set of criticisms and concerns. This Part briefly sets forth more global
criticisms of the use of automatic reversals, all of which apply to the remedy
regardless of the justifications for its use. While the mere presence of a
circuit split indicates that these competing concerns provide sufficient
support for some courts to utilize evidentiary hearings, the following
discussion aims to explain why that choice is misguided.
A. Minimizing Long-Term Costs
The first criticism of the use of automatic reversals is based in economics. Reversing a conviction, the argument goes, produces waste in the form

212 See Ahdieh, supra note 209, at 82 n.235; see also Edward L. Rubin, Putting Rational Actors
in Their Place: Economics and Phenomenology, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1705, 1717 (1998)
(“[M]ethodological individualism is . . . the theoretically argued position that the human
consciousness is the irreducible arena of experience.”).
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of a squandered trial and its side effects.213 According to this line of
reasoning, evidentiary hearings avoid unnecessary waste by distinguishing
trials where an error was “harmless” from those in which a more serious
error occurred. Of course, after the jury is empaneled, lawyers present their
cases and the judge decides, denying that automatic reversals impose costs is
an untenable position. While reversals do impose short-term costs, relying
on evidentiary hearings instead of reversals may increase long-term aggregate costs. As the earlier discussion of deterrence explained, one of the
advantages of automatic reversals is that the remedy may make the perceived cost of future volitional behavior “exceed the advantage of the
offence,”214 and “consequently bring about strong general preventive
effects.”215 Instead of focusing on the immediate, measureable waste caused
by automatic reversals in each case, “deterrence focuses forward on the
prevention of future misconduct.”216 Therefore, while there is no objective
measure of deterrence, it is quite possible—I argue probable—that choosing
to automatically reverse after competency stage deprivations will decrease
the long-term drain on judicial resources and burden on society. Although
reversing in individual cases may be hard to swallow, particularly where the
defendant is extremely dislikable or the crime especially heinous, the
deterrent potential of reversal may lead to an overall reduction in the
number of Ross/Klat-type cases.
B. Empirical Desert and Systematic Credibility
A second criticism of automatic reversals focuses on the moral credibility of the criminal justice system. As proponents of the “empirical desert”
theory of punishment urge, in order to be effective, punishment must be

213 See, e.g., United States v. Pryce, 938 F.2d 1343, 1347 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (“[A]utomatic reversal inflicts on the public the costs of a needless retrial and on other litigants the resulting delays.”);
People v. Hall, 460 N.W.2d 520, 527 (Mich. 1990) (“To require automatic reversal of an otherwise
valid conviction for an error which is harmless constitutes an inexcusable waste of judicial
resources.”); Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 11, Gupta v. United States, 599 U.S. 905 (2010)
(No. 09-711), 2009 WL 4882622, at *11 (“Such an automatic-reversal rule results in a waste of
scarce judicial resources.”).
214 See JEREMY BENTHAM, THE THEORY OF LEGISLATION 325 (C. K. Ogden, ed., Richard Hildreth, trans., 1931).
215 See Andenaes, supra note 179, at 983; see also Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 141
(2009) (“[T]he benefits of deterrence must outweigh the costs.”); United States v. Leon, 468 U.S.
897, 910 (1984) (explaining that, in the context of the exclusionary rule, the increased deterrence
that may come from a broader application of the rule may not outweigh the costs imposed).
216 Kinports, supra note 204, at 854.
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“consistent with the community’s views about what constitutes justice.”217
Community views are important because, if consistent with these views,
“the law gains access to the power and efficiency of stigmatisation[,] . . . gains
compliance by prompting people to defer to it as a moral authority in new
or grey areas[,] . . . and it earns the ability to help shape of [sic] powerful
influence of societal norms.”218 Like deterrence, choosing punishments that
calibrate with empirical desert can help “to minimize future crime.”219
Unlike purely deterrence-based punishments, though, morally credible
punishments can add to the overall credibility of the criminal justice system
and discourage discontent.220 So where does automatic reversal fall?
The moral criticism of automatic reversals is that all defendants
deprived of counsel are treated the same under the remedy. No distinction
is made between the remorseful defendant with a history of mental illness
and the sadistic serial killer—if deprived of counsel at their competency
hearings, both will have their convictions reversed. Yet, in a society where
mental illness is widely misunderstood221 and the perception is that “the
insanity plea defeats justice, discredits psychiatry, and enrages the public,”222 reversing a verdict for any reason related to a defendant’s competence risks undermining the public credibility of the criminal justice system.
While competency stage deprivations focus on a defendant’s Sixth
Amendment right to counsel, meaning that any comparison with the
insanity defense is misguided, public perception that the two are interchangeable may be important to the criminal justice system, even if
inaccurate.
By protecting the constitutional rights of even the most distasteful
defendants, however, automatic reversals can powerfully demonstrate the
217 See Robinson, Competing Conceptions of Modern Desert: Vengeful, Deontological, and Empirical, supra note 200, at 167.
218 Id. at 149-50.
219 Id. at 166.
220 Id. at 153-54.
221 See Karin A. Guiduli, Challenges for the Mentally Ill: The “Threat to Safety” Defense Standard
and the Use of Psychotropic Medication Under Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 144
U. PA. L. REV. 1149, 1159 (1996) (“[T]he hidden and misunderstood nature of mental illness
contributes to suspicion and disbelief that does not exist for physical disabilities. Lurking behind a
diagnosis is the ‘myth of mental illness.’” (quoting THOMAS S. SZASZ, THE MYTH OF MENTAL
ILLNESS (1974))).
222 WILLIAM J. WINSDALE & JUDITH WILSON R OSS, THE INSANITY PLEA 20 (1983);
see also CAL. COMM’N FOR THE REFORM OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, REPORT OF THE
COMMISSION FOR THE REFORM OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, TO THE LEGISLATURE 16-17
(1927) (“An even more serious fault of the present system is that a defendant . . . [can] bring into
the case the whole matter of his sanity . . . . This enables him to submit to the jury great masses of
evidence having no bearing upon the question . . . .”).
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system’s legitimacy.223 Instead of placing “the protection of our most
precious . . . constitutional rights . . . in the tumultuous tides of public
misperception,”224 reversals do not make constitutional protections
dependent on popular opinion. Some guilty defendants might benefit from
their competency stage deprivations, but it is “a fundamental value determination of our society that it is far worse to convict an innocent man than to
let a guilty man go free.”225 The Constitution is not discretionary, and its
protections apply to all.
Even if allowing community intuitions to determine appellate remedies
is not a sufficiently alarming idea, the justifications for doing so have little
force here. No doubt empirical desert is at its most powerful within the
context of traditional criminal law, where punishment rules like the grading
of attempts can be made to neatly map onto community intuitions of
justice.226 But the dangers of vigilantism and noncompliance—two justifications often offered for prioritizing empirical desert—are much less of a
threat when the “community” receiving punishment is the federal judiciary.
In this setting, even if automatic reversals are viewed as disproportionate or
arbitrary, this perception is likely only to increase the remedy’s deterrent
effect. Without moral or theoretical support to stand on, the empirical
desert critique of automatic reversals falls flat.
C. Chilling Effect on Competency Hearings
The last global critique of automatic reversals is practical. Its implications are concerning. If reversal follows every competency stage deprivation,
the remedy could lead to a chilling effect on competency hearings
themselves. As the Ross dissent argued, if raising any sort of questions
223 See Tom R. Tyler & John M. Darley, Building a Law-Abiding Society: Taking Public Views
About Morality and the Legitimacy of Legal Authorities into Account When Formulating Substantive Law,
28 HOFSTRA L. REV. 707, 723 (2000) (“The legitimacy of authorities is an especially promising
basis for the rule of law . . . . [A]uthorities . . . are required to make unpopular decisions, which
may deliver unfavorable outcomes.”). However, many scholars maintain that if legitimacy and
moral credibility conflict, the latter should be chosen. See, e.g., Josh Bowers & Paul H. Robinson,
Perceptions of Fairness and Justice: The Shared Aims and Occasional Conflicts of Legitimacy and Moral
Credibility, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 211, 283 (2012) (“Sometimes, legitimacy is to be prioritized. More often, we think moral credibility is the superior value.”).
224 Weinschenk v. State, 203 S.W.3d 201, 219 (Mo. 2006) (en banc).
225 In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 372 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).
226 See, e.g., Note, The Proposed Penal Law of New York, 64 COLUM. L. REV . 1469, 1522 (1964)
(“Section 110.05 . . . drops the penalty [for attempt] ‘only one notch below that of the crime
attempted.’” (citation omitted)). But cf. MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.05(1) (1985) (“Except as
otherwise provided in this Section, attempt, solicitation and conspiracy are crimes of the same
grade and degree as the most serious offense that is attempted . . . .”).
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regarding a defendant’s competence can create a minefield, “a trial judge
may well be understandably reluctant—especially in marginal cases—to
have any type of proceeding focusing on a defendant’s competence.”227
According to this critique, a trial judge will rationally avoid holding any
additional hearings, even where a defendant’s competence is questionable,
because appellate courts are much “more reluctant to reverse a sub silentio
holding that no further inquiry was necessary.”228 Therefore, automatic
reversals have the potential to harm defendants that are truly incompetent
while undermining the overall accuracy of trials.229
Even the Ross majority acknowledged the legitimate concerns raised by
this critique. As that court stated:
[W]e note that the prosecutor was expressly (and commendably) attempting
to protect the record against this very result through the two motions for
competency hearings. We do not wish to discourage motions for or grants
of competency hearings when the matter is in any doubt but instead seek to
provide guidance on the constitutional and statutory requirements to be
followed so that hearings at this critical stage are not empty formalities but
are meaningful adversarial determinations that generate a record sufficient
for appropriate review on appeal.230

This response connects with one of the affirmative arguments of this
Comment. The purpose of punishment, generally, is to “announc[e] certain
standards of behavior and attach[] penalties for deviation.”231 By attaching
automatic reversals to competency stage deprivations, judges are able to
make decisions with a clear and easy-to-understand penalty in the background. Unlike evidentiary hearings, automatic reversals announce exactly
what punishment will follow each violation, which should encourage
rational calculation. This clarity assuages the effects of uncertainty and
disincentivizes the strategic behavior that uncertainty motivates.
In addition, there would be little threat of a chilling effect because the
new standard imposed on courts is not vague, difficult to understand, or
different from previous requirements. The rule is simple: “a defendant
227 United States v. Ross, 703 F.3d 856, 887 (6th Cir. 2012) (Boggs, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
228 Id.
229 See, e.g., Erica J. Hashimoto, Defending the Right of Self-Representation: An Empirical Look at
the Pro Se Felony Defendant, 85 N.C. L. REV. 423, 428 (2007) (“[C]lose to 80% of pro se felony
defendants were not ordered to undergo competency evaluations . . . .”).
230 Ross, 703 F.3d at 874.
231 Andenaes, supra note 179, at 981-83 (quoting H. L. A. HART , PROLEGOMENON TO
THE PRINCIPLES OF PUNISHMENT 21-22 (1960)).
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[must] be represented by counsel at his own competency hearing, even if he
has previously made a knowing and voluntary waiver of counsel.”232 Courts
will have two clear options to weigh: (1) ensure that the defendant is
represented by counsel at his competency hearing or (2) have any subsequent verdict and sentence reversed automatically. These requirements are
not draconian and compliance should not present a significant new hurdle
for trial judges. After all, the right to counsel is not a new concept and is
relevant at many points during a criminal trial. Regardless, the focus of this
critique is not the choice between reversals or hearings; rather, the Sixth
Amendment requirement itself is at the center of the discussion. Unless the
argument is that only automatic reversals, not the threat of evidentiary
hearings with possible reversal, will lead to a chilling effect, then neither of
the remedies currently used completely avoids the threat of strategic
behavior by judges. While automatic reversal may foster more anxiety in the
judiciary, these effects must be weighed against its benefits. The benefits of
automatic reversals win the day.
CONCLUSION
A criminal defendant may proceed pro se “unless his relinquishment of
the right to counsel cannot be said to be knowing and intelligent.”233 This
requirement asks if the defendant “knows what he is doing and [if] his
choice is made with eyes open.”234 Competency hearings are the tool used to
test his understanding. This is why every circuit to decide the issue has
found it “contradictory to conclude that a defendant whose competency is
reasonably in question could nevertheless knowingly and intelligently waive
her Sixth Amendment right to counsel.”235 The consensus regarding this
finding, however, disappears at the remedy stage. The two remedies used by
this nation’s circuit courts, automatic reversals and evidentiary hearings for
prejudice, lead to different results and provide different incentives. This
Comment provides three different justifications for the use of automatic
reversals—one contractual, one practical, and the last behavioral. From each
of these perspectives, automatic reversal is more consistent with the Sixth
Amendment’s history and purpose. When a criminal defendant chooses to

232
233

Ross, 703 F.3d at 871.
Brief for Petitioner at 16-17, Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975) (No. 73-5772), 1974
WL 186113, at *16-17.
234 Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 279 (1942) (citing Johnson v.
Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 468-69 (1938)).
235 United States v. Klat, 156 F.3d 1258, 1263 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
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proceed pro se, the trial judge must “assume a protective role.”236 If the
judge fails to do so at the competency stage, some alternative source of
protection must exist as a backstop. To provide this form of pro se paternalism,
automatic reversals should be used. The lives and liberties of future
defendants depend on it.

236 See Joshua L. Howard, Hybrid Representation and Standby Counsel: Let’s Clear the Air for the
Attorneys of South Carolina, 52 S.C. L. REV. 851, 856 (2001).

